His central argument is that at the most abstract level, classes can be defined strictly in terms.of economically defined ownership re1ationp.
Political factors enter into the story only at "lower" levels of abstractionp articularly in specifying the necessary institutional conditions for maintaining·t;he basic property relations which define classes. In this paper I will critically examine Roemer's arguments in support of this thesis, I will try to show that while Roemer is correct in arguing that the concept of exploitation can be adequately specified in purely economic terms, the concept of class cannot. Class is an intrinsically political concept and, *Forthcoming in Politics & Society, 1982 . A slightly different earlier version is available as Working Paper Series, No. 161, Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, November 1980. This essay summarizes the central issues in Roemer's forthcoming book, A General Theory of Exploitation and Class (Harvard University Press, 1982) , I will argue, for it to serve its explanatory purposes it must have its political dimensions systematically represented within the concept itself.
The paper is organized as follows. First, I briefly situate the theoretical object of this discussion, class structure~within a broader context of class analysis. This is important to avoid unnecessary confusion over the limits of the discussion. Second, I define the concept of "the political," both as it bears on the problem of the political aspect of practices and of social relations. Once these preliminary conceptual clarifications are done, we will turn to Roemer1s analysis of exploitation and class. The paper ends with a brief discussion of some of the implications of viewing class as an intrinsically political concept. 2
CLASS STRUCTURE AS AN ELEMENT IN CLASS ANALYSIS
It is useful in discussing the concept of class to distinguish three separate elements in a class analysis: class structure, class formation, and class struggle. While each of these presupposes the other two and is definable only in terms of its connection with the other elements, nevertheless it is important to make the distinctions.
Class struggle is defined as the practices of individuals and collectivities in pursuit of class interests; class formation is defined as the social relations within classes which determine the capacities of classes to pursue their interests; and class structure is defined as the social relations between classes which determine or shape the basic interests over which classes-in-formation struggle. These three elements, then} are related in the folTowing manner: 3 class struggle class structure ------------+l class formation
LIMITS
The essential argument of this model of determination is that the underlying structure of class relations imposes limits on the possible forms of. collective class organization which in turn impose limits on the possible forms of class struggle, while within these limits class struggle has transformative effects on both.. class structure and class formation. These transformative effects imply that the limits on class struggle (and on class formation) are not permanently fixed, but change in response to the struggles themselves. It is in this sense that the model can be seen as "dialectical":
struggles transform the conditions.of their own determination.
This model is, of course, purely formal in character. There is no specific content given to any of the terms and no concrete propositions about the nature of the limits and transformations involved. As such it is largely pre-theoretical: the model provides a framework to specify a theory of class, but does not itself constitute such a theory.
One of the critical steps in developing the theory is to elaborate the logic of each of the elements in the model. In this paper I will focus on the concept "class structure," particularly on the question of the role of political relations within the concept. I will not, except in passing, discuss the role of the political in the concepts of class formation and class struggle. This is not to suggest that explicating the concept of class structure is somehow the key to the entire analysis, but simply that it is a necessary starting point.
The Concept of "Political"
In order to define the concept of the political, it is first necessary to define the concept of social practice. Following Althusser. "practice"
can be defined as human activity that transforms some raw material, using 4 specific means of production, into some product.
Practices are thus human activities viewed in a specific way, namely in terms of their transformative effects in the world. Different kinds of practices--or different dimensions of practice--are distinguished by the nature of the transformation process involved (i.e., the nature of the raw material; means of production, transformative activity, and product). In these terms, economic, political, and ideological practices can be defined in the following way:
Economic practices: Activities which produce and transform use-values;
Political practices: Activities which produce and transform social relations;
Ideological practices: Activities which produce and transform the subjective experience of those relations.
Concrete, observed activities of people typically involve aspects of each of these types of practice. When workers work on an assembly line they are simultaneously transforming nature into useful products (economic aspect), producing and reproducing a particular structure of social relations (the political aspect) and particular forms of subjectivity (the ideological aspect).
Corresponding to this distinction among practices or aspects of practice, there is a distinction among social relations (or aspects of those relations). These can be defined as follows:
Economic aspect of social relations: Those features of social relations which shape or limit the activities of transforming nature;
Political aspect of social relations: Those features of social relations which shape or limit the activities of transforming social relations;
Ideological aspect of relations: Those features of relations which shape or limit the activities of transforming subjectivity.
Using the example of the factory, we might say that the technical division of labor is primarily an economic aspect of social relations in that it systematically shapes the activities of transformation of nature; the authority structure is centrally a political aspect of those relations in that it systematically limits the capacities of workers to .
transform the relations within which they work; and the job structure (seniority, competition in internal labor markets, etc.) is centrally an ideological aspect of the relations in that it systematically shapes the subjectivity of workers on the job,S When we speak of "political practices" or "political relations" the terms should be understood as a shorthand for practices or social relations within which the political aspect is the most important. This may be quite difficult to determine empirically in specific cases, as in the debate over whether educational institutions should be viewed as primarily ideological (i.e., producing forms of subjectivity) or primarily economic (producing skilled labor power). The important point in the " present context is acknowledging this complexity of practices and relations and setting the agenda for investigating relationships of the various aspects under discussion.
The specific focus of this paper is the political dimension of the concept of class structure (i. e., the structure of class relations). As already stated, the political aspect of any relation consists of those features of the relation which shape the practices of transforming social.
relations. In these terms, the relations of domination/subordination constitute a quintessentially political aspect of social relations. To say that A dominates B is to say that A not only tells B what to do or in other ways directs B's activities, but also that A has the capacity to constrain B1s attempts at transforming the relationship between A and B. To be a subordinate is not simply to be in a position in which one is given orders, but to be unable to transform the relationship of commandobedience. This is what distinguishes following instructions or suggestions in a reciprocal relationship and following orders in a hierarchical relation.
They may be behaviorally equivalent in a given instance, but they are structurally quite distinct. The question at hand, then, is whether this particular political aspect of social relations--domination/subordination--is an essential element in defining class-relations. I will argue in the next section that John Roemer is quite correct that such relations of domination are not central to the definition of exploitation as such, but that they are necess~ry for the specification of class relations.
ROEMER'S TREATMENT OF DOMINATION IN THE CONCEPTS OF CLASS AND EXPLOITATION
In his discussions of class and exploitation, Roemer adopts two rather different stances towards the problem of domination. In the first part of his analysis he argues that both class and exploitation can be specified strictly in terms of the distribution of property rights, without any reference to domination relations. At the end of the paper, when he introduces a game-theoretic way of analyzing exploitation, he argues that there is an implied relation of domination in the concept of exploitation and thus in class as well. What I will argue is that Roemer is correct in the first formulation regarding the concept of exploitation, and in the second regarding the concept of class: class requires domination relations, exploitation does not.
Let us first examine the strategy Roemer employs to investigate exploitation and class as direct consequences of the distribution of property rights. His strategy is to examine several different economies which differ only in terms of the kinds of markets which are allowed in them and in the character of the distribution of productive assets. In the course of these investigations he proves two propositions, both of which may at first glance seem quite surprising. First, he shows that exploitation can occur in situations in which all producers own their own means of production, and thus there is no domination whatsoever within the actual process of production; and second, he shows that there is complete symmetry in the structure of exploitation in a system in which capital hires wage laborers and in a system in which workers rent capital. Let us look at each of these in turn.
Roemer demonstrates that exploitation can exist in an economy in which every producer owns his or her own means of production and in which there is consequently no market in either labor power or means of production; the only things that are traded are final products of various sorts, but different producers own different amounts of productive assets. The result is that some producers have to work more hours than other producers to produce the exchange-equivalent of their own SUbsistence. What Roemer shows in this simple economy is that the result of trade among producers is not only that some producers work less than others for the same subsistence, but that the producers who work less are able to do so because the less-endowed producers have to work more. That is, an actual transfer of labor occurs from the asset-poor to the asset~rich. (The critical proof is that if the asset-poor person simply stopped producing--died--the asset-rich producer would be worse off than before and have to work longer hours.) Since in this economy the exploiter clearly does not in any way directly dominate the exploited--they both own their own means of production and use them as they please--this example shows that exploitation does not presuppose immediate domination relations. Of course, a repressive apparatus may be needed to guarantee the property rights themselves--to protect the asset-rich from theft of assets by the assetpoor--but no domination directly between the rich and poor is implied. These results force some reevaluation, I think, of the classical belief that the labor process is at the center of the Marxian analysis of exploitation and class., I have demonstrated that the entire constellation of Marxian "welfare" concepts can be generated with no institution for the exchange of labor. Furthermore, this has been done at the level of abstraction at which Marxian value theory is customarily performed. This casts serious doubt on the project of elevating the labor process to central stage in the Marxian theory of exploitation .
• .
• . . . Exploitation can be mediated entirely through the exchange of produced commodities, and classes can exist with respect to a credit market instead of a labor market--at least at this classical level of abstraction.
This is not to say coercion is not necessary to produce Marxian exploitation and class: rather, that is suffices for the coercion to be at the point of maintaining property relations and not at the locus of extracting surplus labor directly from the worker. 6
Political relations are important for instituionally reproducing class and exploitation, but they are not constitutive elements in the very definitions of these concepts.
This is not, however, the only assessment of domination made in
Roemer's analysis. Towards the end of the paper, when a game-theoretic approach to comparing different systems of exploitation is introduced, domination reenters the analysis as a central feature. The objective of this part of the paper is to provide a general strategy for assessing claims about different groups of agents being exploited or not exploited in different ways. The device is to treat the production system as a kind of game and to ask if a coalition of players would be better off if they withdrew from the game under certain specified procedures. Different types of exploitation are then defined by the withdrawal rules which would make certain kinds of agents better off. In this way "feudal e?Cploitation" is defined as the situation in which agents would be better off if they withdrew from the game with only their personal assets (i.e., if they were freed from relations of personal bondage), whereas capitalist.
exploitation is defined as the situation in which agents would be better off if they left the game with their per capita share of total social assets (not just personal assets).
Roemer's gattle is an extremely clever and insightful device, but it immediately runs into certain problems unless some additional specifications are added. For example, under the rules laid out so far, the handicapped could be said to exploit the healthy feudalistically, since the healthy would be better off if they withdrew with their personal assets from the game in which the handicapped are aided. Even more damaging, perhaps, if two islands, one rich and one poor, are arbitrarily grouped together even though they have no relations with each other, the poor island would be considered "exploited" capitalistically by the richer one (i.e., it would be better off if it withdrew from the game with its per capita share of the combined assets of the two islands).
It is to avoid these and related problems that Roemer added a number of further specifications of the game-theoretic approach in footnote 3 to the paper. There he states:
A coalition S is viewed as exploited • .
• with respect to a particular conception of" the alternative (embodied in the characteristic function of a game, v) if: (i) S does better under alternative v than it is currently doing at the given allocation; (ii) S's complement S' does worse under the alternative v; (iii) s' is in a relation of dominance to S.7
This final criterion implies that a relationship of domination in some sense or other is required for the definition of exploitation and class.
The handicapped do not dominate the healthy--indeed, if anything, the relations of domination are in the opposite direction--and thus even if they receive benefits from the assets of the healthy, they cannot be considered exploiters. Similarly, the poor island is not exploited by the rich one, since even though it would benefit from getting its per capita share of the two islands' combined'assets, there is no social relationship between the people of the two islands. S Why is it that in the discussion of the game-theoretic strategy of analyzing class and exploitation Roemer was compelled to introduce relations of domination into the basic definition of class, whereas~n his earlier discussion he was not? The answer, I think. lies in the fact that the initial discussion was confined to the problem of exploitation and class within commodity-producing economic systems, whereas the gametheory discussion was designed to explicate the problem across fundamentally different economic systems, including non-commodity-producing economies. Since feudalism, for example, revolves around relations of bondage, and this is at the heart of the definition of feudal class relations, it is impossible to generate a purely eco?omic definition of feudal classes. So-called "extra-economic coercion" must be considered part of the definition of class relations in feudalism, not simply an institutional boundary-setting political process. Within commodityproducing societies, however, it appears that political relations are essentially separated from economic relations and it becomes possible to talk about classes and property rights as if they did not imply domination.
This view of the relationship between class and exploitation in commodity-producing systems is, I believe, incorrect. Let us return to
Roemer's discussion of simple commodity production and the two market "islands." In each of these analyses Roemer convincingly shows that exploitation can be specified strictly in terms of property rights and with very different levels of final consumption--rich and poor standards of living (rather than just high and low levels of toil). Why is not the distinction "rich" and "poor" itself a class distinction?
The reason, I would argue, is that the rich do not dominate the poor in the simple commodity-producing society. There is no social relationship which necessarily directly binds them to each other in a relation of domination/subordination. In both the credit market island and the labor market island, on the other hand, the owners and nonowners are bound together through direct relations of domination/subordination.
There is thus a crucial difference between having few assets, but still enough to produce one's own means of subsistence, and having no assets, and thus having to either sell one's labor power or rent the assets of u· .15
others. In the former case, rich asset-owners do not directly tell the poor asset-owners what to do--they do not directly dominate them; in the latter case, a new kind of social relation is generated between the assetowner and nonowner. Owners dominate nonowners.
This difference between the two situations implies that the general term "property rights" has a different social content in the two cases.
In the simple commodity-producing economy, property rights only specify a set of effective powers over things--productive assets. While of course such effective powers imply that one has the right to exclude other people from using those assets (or prevent them from taking them), the right itself implies no ongoing relationship between people in which effective powers over people are exercised. In the credit and labor market economies, on the other hand, property rights imply both a set of effective powers over things and effective powers directly over people. The owner of assets not only has the right to use those assets but the right to control in specific ways the behavior of people without assets who desire to gain access to the assets in question. The labor contract and the credit contract both imply a relation of domination) an agreement on the part of the asset1ess to follow certain orders from the asset-owners.
I would argue that it is precisely because property rights in the labor and credit market islands entail such relations of domination/ subordination that one is justified in saying that the exploitation relations in this case constitute a class relation and not simply a b . the forms of domination which govern laboring activity within production. ll
IMPLICATIONS FOR CLASS ANALYSIS
The argument that the political is intrinsic to the concept of class at even the highest level of abstraction has a number of important implications for class analysis. I will discuss several of these: (1) implications for the labor theory of value; (2) implications for the defense of the Marxist concept of class against its various bourgeois rivals; (3) implications for the more concrete elaboration of the concept of class in capitalist societies; (4) implications for the problem of classes in socialism; and (5) implications for the general Marxist analysis of modes of production.
The Labor Theory of Value
Roemer argues that the essential justification of choosing labor power as the numeraire commodity for defining value and exploitation is that it is uniformly distributed throughout the population. This property is essential for a "proper" theory of exploitation--that is, a theory which classifies the poor as exploited and the rich as exploiters. Only labor power, Roemer argues, has this property since "no produced commodity is uniformly distributed since proletarians are dispossessed of all productive 12 assets."
Furthermore, since the purpose of the theory is precisely to explain class struggle between capitalists and workers, and since the use of labor power as the numeraire commodity for value and exploitation generates a theory of exploitation which corresponds to the polarization between capitalists and workers, this choice of numeraire is dictated by the explanatory objectives of the theory.
Once we add domination relations directly into our conception of 
Marxist vs. Non-Marx~s~Concepts of Cla~s
Non-Marxist concepts of class take typically one of two forms:
either they are structured around categories of distribution without <.
reference to domination, or they are structured around categories of domination without reference to distribution. In the first of these tendencies, class is defined either directly in terms of distributional outcomes--typically income--or in terms of the proximate determinants of those outcomes--typically occupation or "market capacity" (the Weberian approach). In either case, relations of domination are either entirely absent from the discussion or of strictly incidental importance.
The second tendency, most explicitly found in the work of Ralph Dahrendorf, defines classes solely in terms of power or authority relations.
There are "command classes" and "obey classes" in every instit~tional
sphere of the society, with no special status being given to economic 1. Within production relations, domination without appropriation and appropriation without domination are unreproducible structures of social relations. 14 2. The coincidence of domination and appropriation within production relations provides the basis for understanding collective actors in the epochal processes of social conflict and social change. lS
The first of these can be termed the "conditions of existence" argument, the second, the "historical materialism" argument. Let us briefly examine each in turn.
-
The first thesis states that if it should happen through some historical process that a noncorrespondence should occur between the relations of domination and appropriation within the social relations of production, the situation would be highly unstable and tend towards a restoration of correspondence. Imagine, for example, that as the result of a series of labor reforms, workers organized in militant trade unions won the capacity to collectively organize the process of work, including the ability to allocate labor and means of production to different purposes, but that the rights to the products produced with these means of production, and thus the appropriation of the surplus product, remained in private hands.. Capitalists could not tell workers what to do or fire them, but because they owned the means of production and appropriated the surplus product they could effectively veto any investment decision made by workers (i.e., they could decide to consume their surplus rather than let it be used productively).
This would be a situation in which appropriation brought with it no immediate power of domination, and domination was unaccompanied by appropriation. In such a situation it seems likely that either workers would attempt to extend their powers to include actual appropriation .£E. that the capacity to block investments would become an effective new means of domination by the appropriators, thus undermining or limiting the apparent domination of production by workers.
In these outcomes it is predicted that a radical noncorrespondence between appropriation and domination within the relations of production cannot endure for long periods of time. There are two basic reasons for this. First,~he appropriation of surplus prod~cts requires power.
Direct producers typically do not like to toil for the benefit of exp10it-/ ing classes, and unless there are coercive mechanisms at the disposal of the exploiting class to force them to~o so, the level of exploitation is likely to decline. Just ·as feudal lords needed coercive capacity to force peasant serfs to work the demesne lands) so capitalist owners need coercive capacity to force workers to perform labor within the labor process of the capitalist factory. 
Implications .for the Concrete Investigation of Class Structures
Abstract concepts are to be evaluated not only in terms of their logical presuppositions and coherence, but in terms of their usefulness for more concrete investigations. One of the advantages of a concept of class that is defined explicitly in terms of the unity of exploitation
and domination relations is that it provides a systematic strategy for examining capitalist class relations at more concrete levels.
In particular, such a concept provides a way of understanding the class character of managerial positions within capitalist production. The explicit specification of class in terms of both exploitation and domination thus provides a direct strategy for more concrete analyses of class.
The Analysis of Socialist Exploitation and Class
One of the most promising lines of investigation opened up in Roemer's work is the strategy for analyzing exploitation in socialist societies.
Roemer suggests that socialist exploitation should be understood in terms of inequalities generated by the distribution of "inalienable assets," Le., skills. The exploiters in socialism are those who possess skills; the exploited are the unskilled. In terms of Roemer's formal criteria for exploitation, this seems a reasonable way of characterizing the distributional outcomes of skill inequalities in socialist societies.
The question, however, is whether or not this kind of exploitation.
can be considered a class relationship. I would argue that if in addition to benefiting from an exploitive redistribution, the skilled also dominate the unskilled, then this relationship would constitute a class relation.
But, unlike the case of owners of alienable assets, the sheer possession of skills does not logically entail a relation of domination of the skilled over the unskilled. It is entirely possible, for example, to imagine a situation in which production was controlled by democratic bodies of all workers which decide on production priorities and procedures and which give orders to both skilled and unskilled workers, and yet the skilled still received an exploitive redistribution of income. This would be the case, for example, if the only way of inducing people to acquire skills is through heavy incentives which effectively redistribute income from the unskilled to the skilled. But this would not imply that within the actual organization of ongoing production it was skilled workers who dominate unskilled workers. In such a situation, the skilled could reasonably be regarded as a privileged stratum of workers, but not as a different class.
The two kinds of "socialist" societies we have described are likely to have very different forms of social conflict, even though they may share a similar pattern of distribution. In the society in which the skilled actually dominate the unskilled as well as exploit them, it would be expected that social conflicts would be likely to crystallize around the unskilled-skilled cleavage. In a society in which, on the other hand, the skilled do not dominate the unskilled, even though they receive exploitive redistributive benefits, then conflicts would be less likely to take on a class-like character. Conflicts might center on cultural transformations aimed at changing the motivational underpinnings of the incentive structures, but there would be no necessary tendency for cleavages to correspond to the skilled-unskilled lines of demarcation. If we fail to distinguish these two societies by failing to incorporate the notion of domination into the specification of class relations, however, then in both cases skilled and unskilled would have
to e regar e as antagon~st~c c asses.
Modes of Production
I argued earlier that including the political in the structural definition of class facilitated a class analysis of social conflicts implicated in epochal social change. In this final section I will examine the implications of this definition of classes for the theoretical specification of the "epochsl~themselves, that is, of "modes of production."
In distinguishing capitalism and feudalism as modes of production,
Marxists have usually stressed that in feudalism exploitation required "extra-economic" coercion whereas in capitalism exploitation was purely "economic." This formula·tion was typically accompanied by the claim that in feudalism politics and economics (or the state and production)
were institutionally fused in the social organization of the feudal manor, whereas in capitalism the political and the economic are institutionally separated.
The argument of this paper challenges this traditional view of modes of production. Classes in both capitalism and feudalism imply domination, and not simply system-preserving coercion, but domination directly within the social organization of production itself. The issue is wh.ere the coercion is located, how it is organized, and how it is articulated to other aspects of the system of production (technical, ideological, etc.). Instead of seeing the contrast between capitalism and feudalism as economic exploitation vs. extra-economic coercion, the contrast ,should be formulated as follows: class exploitation based on noncoercion outside the labor process + coercion inside the labor process vs. coercion outside the labor process + self-determination inside. That is, the issue is precisely how the political dimension of the production relations is linked to the economic dimension of those same relations. 19
This way of undershanding production suggests the following simple SIt would be incorrect, however, to say that such labels exhaust the character of any of these concrete aspects of the social relations within , the factory. The technical division of labor also influences capacities to transform social Lelations; authority relations also shape subjectivity, and so on. 10 But note: where fathers both exploit and dominate their children, as is true in some societies, then the father-child relation could be considered a form of class relation.
llIn an earlier version of this paper I attempted to justify the concern. with domination on the grounds that workers, being labor-time minimizers (one of the assumptions in Roemer's models), would try to work as little as possible once employed by owners. Domination was thus needed to get them actually to perform labor, or in traditional Marxist terms, to transform labor power into labor. Roemer and others pointed out in discussions of that initial analysis that this was quite parallel to the prob lem of capi talis ts' "cheating" each other in their exchanges) i. e. , violating the terms of the exchange contract. The problem of cheating, resistance, etc. can thus be considered a problem at a "lower level of abstraction" than the specification of the formal exchange relation itself.
And thus, just as Marx ignored the problem of cheating among capitalists and the need for institutional safeguards against such cheating (although much contract law is concerned with this) in his abstract analysis of the capitalist mode of production, so, it was argued, we can ignore the problem of cheating by workers (i.e., failing to perform the amount of labor specified in the contract). The problem of domination) however, is not simply one of responding to resistance on the part of workers; it is also a question of exercising effective powers over workers' activities in order to get them to do what the capitalist wants them to do. While this is directly entailed by capitalist property rights, it is a mistake to talk as if it is the property rights as such and not the domination relations implied by them which are constitutive of class relations. Property , rights which do not entail relations of domination do not define class relations. This is precisely the case in the simple commodity-producing economy.
12 p • 33 of manuscript.
13Labor time is, of course, only a measure of the quantitative dimension of domination relations, not of its qualitative characteristics.
The argument here is not that labor time by itself provides an adequate way of analyzing domination, but rather that it is the one metric of value which expresses both the magnitude of the product and the magnitude of domination. Any basic good can accomplish the first of these objectives, but only labor time can accomplish both.
14The contention here is not that there need be a perfect coincidence in every social position between these two aspects of production relations, but simply that a complete noncorrespondence could not be stable. It is entirely possible in capitalist production for certain positions--middle and lower management for example--to be in a domination relation to workers without being in an appropriation relation. This kind of noncoincidence is the heart of the concept of "contradictory locations within class removed from the "public sphere") th~ough the organization of the "politics of production" within the private factory. In feudalism there was a coincidence of the political dimension of production and the political To be dimension of the state--both were united in the feudal lord, and thus the politics of production had a "public" character. In capitalism it is not that the political and the economic are institutionally separated, but rather that the political dimension of production is institutionally separated from the public sphere. For related arguments on the concept of politics of. production, see Michael Burawoy, " 
